Ergogenics

  [Definitie:] "An ergogenic aid is any substance or phenomenon that enhances performance." (Wilmore and Costill)

  Nieuwsbrief over doping, supplementen, voeding en training

  DDR-doping       "Doping was verplicht"       DDR-sport & Stasi       Tsjechisch dopingprogramma    

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Ook de Russen hadden een geheim dopingprogramma

De voormalige Sowjet-Unie had, net als Oost-Duitsland, een geheim instituut dat de effecten van doping op sporters onderzocht. Dat schrijft Michael Kalinski in een artikel voor de november-editie van Deutsche Zeitschrift für Sportmedizin. Het artikel gaat over de periode van de vroege jaren zeventig.

Dat er in de oude DDR een geheim anabolenprogramma van de staat bestond, staat sinds 1990 als een paal boven water. Wetenschappers vermoedden dat ook andere communistische landen op sporters experimenteerden en de eerste geruchten dat Russische sporters anabolen gebruikten dateren al uit de jaren zestig. Harde bewijzen ontbraken echter. Tot nu.

Kalinski baseert zich in zijn studie op een document van 39 bladzijden, dat door een Russische wetenschapper de Verenigde Staten in werd gesmokkeld. Nadat de wetenschapper het Amerikaans staatsburgerschap had verkregen, kwam het op het Kalinski's bureau terecht. Toen kwam aan 28 jaar geheimhouding een einde.

Het document is een samenvatting van onderzoeken door onderzoekers van het State Central Institution of Physical Culture in Moskou. Dat is een afdeling van het Research Laboratory of Training Programming and Physiology of the Sport Performance. Het instituut was de instelling op sportgebied in de oude Sowjet-Unie.

Er zijn 150 exemplaren van het verslag in 1972 met de post verstuurd naar coaches en kleinere onderzoeksinstellingen op sportgebied binnen de Sowjet-Unie. De verslagen vertelden hoe en in welke doseringen sporters anabolen moesten gebruiken. Het exemplaar dat Kalinski in handen kreeg is oorspronkelijk gestuurd naar het Instituut voor Lichaamscultuur in Kiew, de huidige Ukraïne.

Resultaten

Het rapport gaat over twee anabolen: retabolil, de Russische deca-durabolin, en nerobol, de Russische dianabol. De onderzoekers experimenteerden op langlaufers, basketballers, gewichtheffers, worstelaars, wielrenners, roeiers, schaatsers, gymnasten, licht-atleten en schermers.

Zo kregen biatleten in een uit 1971 en 1972 daterend onderzoek dertig dagen lang elke dag 15 milligram nerobol. Het gevolg was uiteraard dat hetlichaamsgewicht, de arm- en beenomvang toenam en het vetpercentage daalde, maar ook dat het duurvermogen van de sporters verbeterde. De concentratie van de zuurstoftransportmolecuul hemoglobine nam toe met dertien procent, waardoor de VO2max steeg. Verder ging het hart in rust regelmatiger slaan.

In een andere studie kregen Kraftgymnasten - de Russische variant van bodybuilding - en licht-atleten dertig dagen lang dagelijks 15 milligram nerobol of vier injecties van 50 milligram retabolil.

Het zijn in het licht van wat er vandaag in de dopingscene gebeurt lichte doseringen. Voor sporten waarbij spiermassa een goede zaak is, adviseerden de onderzoekers een dosis van 15 milligram Nerobol per dag, niet langer dan vier weken. Tenminste: voor sporters zwaarder dan tachtig kilo. Anders was het 10 milligram. Daarna moesten de atleten minstens twee weken wachten voordat ze weer aan een kuurtje begonnen. Trainers mochten de procedure maximaal zes keer per jaar herhalen.

De doseringen retabolil waren nog bescheidener. Om spiermassa aan te zetten adviseerden de onderzoekers elke week een injectie van 50 milligram vier weken lang. Voor sporters die lichter waren dan tachtig kilo volstond een injectie per tien dagen. Tussen twee kuurtjes moesten de sporters minimaal een maand rust in acht nemen, en jaarlijks moest het gebruik beperkt blijven tot 1200 milligram hormoon.

De doseringen waren genoeg om de sportieve prestaties een eind vooruit te helpen. In het geval van nerobol waren speerwerpers in staat om in een tijdspanne van twee weken het gewicht met het schouderdrukken met tien kilo te verhogen, het bankdrukken met vijf kilo en het squatten met 10 kilo. Tegelijkertijd gooiden ze de speer zes meter verder.

Bijwerkingen bleven ook bij die lichte doseringen niet achterwege. De proefkonijnen - die waarschijnlijk verplicht waren te gebruiken - kregen last van oedeem, impotentie, slapeloosheid, huiduitslag, steriliteit, vergroting van de geslachtsorganen en hoofdpijn. Bij pubers stopte de groei. Sporters scheurden aanhechtingen of beschadigden hun gewrichten. Toch moesten de trainers dat maar op de koop nemen, vonden de onderzoekers. De middelen hielpen de Sowjet-Unie aan medailles.

De onderzoekers experimenteerden ook met hoger doseringen. Ze beschrijven hoe ze bij gewichtheffers de dosering van de nerobol twaalf dagen lang dagelijks met vijf milligram verhoogden, en uiteindelijk dus zestig milligram op een dag slikten. Het schema was bedoeld om de sporters 'klaar' te krijgen voor een speciaal evenement. De onderzoekers beschrijven hoe de proefpersonen uiteindelijk vast overtuigd waren dat ze hun gewicht in de wedstrijd zouden halen, en vooral veel zin hadden om te trainen. Dat effect was echter verdwenen zodra de toediening van de anabolen stopte. Toen hadden de sporters juist de grootst mogelijke moeite om nog aan het ijzer te gaan.

Op de laatste bladzijde van hun verslag vertellen de onderzoekers zelfs dat sommige van hun proefpersonen verslaafd aan de anabolen waren geraakt. Hoe het met hen afliep, of met de sporters die ziek werden, meldt het verslag niet.

Topje van de ijsberg

Kalinski vreest dat het door hem opgedoken document nog maar het topje van de ijsberg is. Er was in de DDR al een schat aan onderzoeksliteratuur, verzameld door de ongeveer vijftienhonderd artsen en trainers die bij het geheime dopingproject waren betrokken. De DDR had 17 miljoen inwoners. De Sowjet-Unie 190 miljoen.

Maar zullen die documenten ooit boven water komen? Kalinski heeft er een hard hoofd in. Toen de muur viel hebben betrokkenen in de DDR de documenten uit de bibliotheken verwijderd. In de Sowjet-Unie zou wel eens hetzelfde gebeurd kunnen zijn.

Voor de duizenden gedupeerde sporters - die schadevergoeding willen eisen - is dat een probleem. Wetenschappelijk is de schade minder. Het document waar Kalinski zich op baseert maakt duidelijk dat er veel fouten zaten in de proefopzet van de experimenten. Zo hielden de onderzoekers er geen rekening mee dat anabolengebruikers meer eiwitten, vitamines en joules gingen eten. Daar zorgden de trainers voor. In hoeverre de verbeterde prestaties op rekening komen van dat verbeterde dieet, en niet van de anabolen, is nooit onderzocht.

Kalinski als exegeet

Michael Kalinski doceert nu aan de Kent State University in Ohio. Hij heeft gestudeerd aan de Kyiv State Institute of Physical Education en is nu verbonden aan het Research Institute of Biochemistry, Kyiv, Ukraine.

Toen Kalinski nog in de Ukraïne woonde, heeft hij twintig jaar onderzoek gedaan naar cAMP en het enzym eiwit kinase in de spieren van sporters. Over dat onderzoek schreef hij in 1995 Exercise and Intracellular Regulation of Cardiac and Skeletal Muscle, dat een kijkje geeft in wat er in Russische laboratoria gebeurt.

Zou de bron van het geheime document dat Kalinski heeft beschreven niet gewoon Kalinski zelf zijn geweest?

1. Doping-Forschung in der Sowjetunion. Geheimes Dokument belegt staatliche "Förderung". ZDF.de, 5-12-2002.
2. M.I. Kalinski, M.S. Kerner. Empfehlungen zum Einsatz von anabolen Steroiden im Sport aus dem ehemaligen Sowjetunion - Daten aus einem geheimem Dokument. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Sportmedizin, Jahrgang 53, nr. 11 (2002), blz. 317-324.
3. Paul Cribb. The latest on muscle overload, growth hormone detection, and anabolic steroids: Research from the 6th International Olympic Committee World Congress on Sport Science: Steroid use confirmed in the former Soviet Union. AST Sports Science, 12-8-2002.

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Former sports scientist reveals Soviet steroid program for athletes

Verleden jaar schreven we over onthullingen van de biochemicus Michael Kalinski over het geheime Russische dopingprogramma. Kalinski baseerde zich toen op documenten die een Russische wetenschapper, die betrokken was bij opvoeren van sporters, het land had uitgesmokkeld. Die wetenschapper was hijzelf, blijkt uit een artikel in de Salt Lake Tribune. Hieronder een interview met een insider die nog steeds het achterste van zijn tong niet laat zien. De meest interessante alina's hebben we gemerkt.

A former top Soviet sports scientist has revealed a secret document that buttresses long-held suspicions that Soviet sporting success was built on the systematic use of banned anabolic steroids.

Only after Michael Kalinski obtained citizenship in another country did he dare speak publicly about the document that described state-supported steroid research on athletes and recommended that elite weightlifters, boxers, wrestlers, gymnasts, fencers and endurance athletes inject the drugs to boost performance. "I could not speak in my country and here I can," said Kalinski. "That's the major reason."

Although many in the West had long suspected that Soviet domination of Olympic sport was steroid-fueled, no concrete proof of a state-sanctioned doping program had surfaced since the Soviet Union collapsed more than a decade ago. After the secrets of the East German doping apparatus were found in classified police documents in 1990, similar revelations were expected to emerge from the Soviet Union and other East Bloc nations.

But none surfaced until Kalinski stepped forward with the first solid evidence that the Soviet government backed drug research on athletes and supported steroid use. "It's understandable that he's nervous," said Tom Fahey, a professor of exercise physiology at Cal State Chico, who encouraged Kalinski to make the report public. Not only was Kalinski uniquely positioned as an insider to provide the first credible information about Soviet steroid programs, but the research itself - administering steroids to athletes - could never be duplicated.

  "Even though it's abhorrent research, the information is still valuable," said Fahey. The 39-page document was likely the starting point for the rapid spread of steroids throughout Soviet sport, said Kalinski. By circulating the report to elite sport institutes, government agencies were encouraging sports officials, coaches and athletes to use the drugs. "It's an official recommendation from the top," said Kalinski.

Now a U.S. citizen and professor at Kent State University, Kalinski received the classified research report, "Anabolic Steroids and Sport Capacity," in 1972 when he was chairman of the department of sport biochemistry of the Kiev Institute of Physical Culture. The Institute's research vice president instructed him to pass the document, one of 150 copies printed and numbered "for limited use," to four other department chairs.

He never did. The report, he concluded, touted steroid use while ignoring possible side affects, which he knew included decreased sperm production, impotence, premature puberty in young athletes, liver problems and skeletal muscle injuries. So he put the document in his desk and hoped that his actions would save some Ukrainian athletes from steroid abuse. Destroying it wasn't an option. At any time, he could have been asked to account for the numbered document. Exposing the report in the West would have landed him in a Soviet Gulag for revealing state secrets or at least resulted in banishment from his field, he said. His mentor at the university had long ago taught him to keep his mouth shut. "We all felt helpless and that the KGB was in charge," he said.

It never occurred to Kalinski that he held a smoking gun that could someday help expose the sordid truth behind Soviet sporting achievements and perhaps lead to the rewriting of Olympic history. Like others, he assumed the Soviet empire would last forever.

But by the time Kalinski left the Soviet Union in late 1990, the unthinkable was happening. The Berlin Wall had fallen. Communist regimes had been overthrown in former East Bloc satellite states. The Soviet Union was in turbulence. A beaten-down populace was suddenly challenging authority. Ukrainian students were in revolt, staging hunger strikes and demanding dissolution of the Ukrainian republic's government.

Before flying to the United States, Kalinski tucked the document into his briefcase. "I knew it was probably the most valuable thing I had," he said. (Da's raar. Hierboven zei hij wat anders... - WK) Not until he obtained U.S. citizenship a decade later did he consider making the document public. His top priority during his early years in the U.S. was to re-establish his academic career. He feared that revealing the document at that point would be seen as a ploy to gain advantage.

He also knew that revealing information about Soviet drug use would bring condemnation at home. He could even have been accused of being involved in the research himself. The West German couple who revealed the secrets of a massive East German doping program through documents stored in STASI secret police archives found themselves heavily criticized for exposing dirty stories about drug cheats. "Their feeling of patriotism is that you should not expose the past of your country," he said.

His document is the first of its kind to be made public. In a dozen years since the fall of the Soviet Union, no other such evidence has emerged about doping in Soviet sport. "I can guess why," Kalinski said. In the economic turmoil following the collapse of the Soviet Union, people had more important things on their minds. "If a professor's salary falls to $80 to $100 dollars a month [after the fall of Communism], and the prices are the same, would you think of papers you received 30 years ago?" he said.

Evidence of a state-run Soviet doping program could also have been purposely destroyed. Without the efforts of Brigitte Berendonk and Werner Franke, the existence of the East German doping machine may not have surfaced either. Berendonk was a former West German Olympian whose doctor father had removed his family from East Germany in 1958 to prevent his athletic daughter from falling into the country's doping program. [ErGs]

Driven to expose how a tiny country had transformed itself into an international sporting power, Berendonk and her husband, molecular biologist Werner Franke, tracked down STASI archives that documented doses and dates of steroid administration to East German athletes over a quarter of a century. Germany eventually brought more than 400 charges of causing bodily harm against former East German sports leaders, physicians and coaches.

No charges have ever been laid against Soviet officials, although the Soviet doping machine was likely much larger. With only a tenth of the population of the Soviet Union, East Germany had 1,500 researchers, physicians and coaches involved in doping. Kalinski assumes that his document represents "a very small window" into the steroid research carried out during the years of Soviet domination of Olympic sport.

  He is also skeptical that the state's greatest steroid secrets would have arrived at his institute by mail, especially when the state had a system in place for circulating more sensitive material. To view classified Communist party documents, Kalinski had to report to a special office at his institute to read them. More explosive steroid directives could have been circulated in the same manner, with Kalinski outside the loop. (Aha - het rapport dat Kalinski in handen kreeg was dus het topje van de ijsberg - WK)

Steroid research was unlikely to have been conducted without the knowledge of central authorities, who approved the five-year research plans of all Soviet sports institutes.

  The recommendations for steroid use also seem overly ambitious for the data presented, which leaves Kalinski wondering if they were based on more extensive research deemed too sensitive to include in the classified document. Soviet scientists, he points out, had just as much incentive as athletes and coaches to chase Olympic medals. Olympic success translated into free apartments, cars, state stipends and foreign travel for them, too.

  Keeping such a program secret wasn't difficult in a totalitarian regime. Kalinski never talked to his Soviet colleagues about steroid use. Distrust was almost as palpable as in North Korea, he said. When a group of top North Korean sport scientists visited his Kiev institute, Kalinski noticed they were afraid to say a word to each other.

  After Kalinski published a book on sports nutrition in 1986 - he wrote or co-wrote eight other books on sports-science-related topics - he began to be invited as a lecturer in the Soviet Union. After one lecture, a weightlifter took him aside to ask about growth hormone.
Kalinski told him it may cause acromegaly, or increased bone growth.
The weightlifter persisted: "So do you think it's a good thing?"
Kalinski told him he didn't know.

  "Because I really didn't know," Kalinski said. "I knew only the basics. It was like in a movie. His expression was like, 'You're cheating me and you don't want to tell me for some reason. You don't feel I'm important.' He was using it for sure," said Kalinski. "He felt it gave him an advantage. So he simply didn't believe what I was telling him. He couldn't believe that a scientist wouldn't know."

For Kalinski, speaking out is also a way to quiet other ghosts. His own country, Ukraine, suffered heavily under Soviet domination, with at least 7 million Ukrainians believed to have perished in a state-induced famine in the 1930s. Among the victims: Kalinski's grandfather. An uncle was also taken by the Soviet secret police and never seen again.

The Ukrainian Parliament passed a resolution in May declaring the famine an act of genocide. Two weeks later, Kalinski presented a lecture on "Ergogenic Aids in Soviet Elite Sport" at a sports-science conference in San Francisco. Last month, he lectured on doping in Soviet sport at a conference in Berlin.

  Now Kalinski wants to hunt down death records of Soviet Olympic champions. "I expect we will be amazed," he said.

  A 1984 British study in Nature found that 26 Soviet Olympic medalists died between 1976 and 1982 at an average age of 41. Among the dead: Alexander Belov at age 26. Belov scored the winning basket against the United States in the controversial 1972 Olympic men's basketball final. Further collaborating a link between steroid use and early death, a Finnish study published last year reported that former Finnish power lifters - a sport where steroid use was rampant - were almost five times more likely to die than age-matched peers.

Doping athletes indiscriminately for the glory of the Soviet state was a crime against humanity in the same way that purposely starving millions of people to death was criminal, Kalinski believes. "If they didn't care about 10 million people, why would they care about 26 athletes when it's about the prestige of the Communist system?" he said.

Russia's new government likely did not press sports scientists involved in steroid research or officials who administered doping programs to resign their jobs, Kalinski said. So those responsible probably continue in prominent positions.

Dit artikel is een ingekorte versie van: Janet Rae Brooks. Sunday Special: Former sports scientist reveals Soviet steroid program for athletes. The Salt Lake Tribune, 31-8-2003.

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